貿(mào)易是人類進行商品和服務(wù)交易的重要方式,同時也是推動人類社會前進和經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的核心驅(qū)動力。下面是學(xué)習(xí)啦小編帶來的貿(mào)易英語閱讀文章，歡迎閱讀!

　　貿(mào)易英語閱讀文章1

　　歐元區(qū)經(jīng)濟經(jīng)受住英國脫歐首輪沖擊

　　The eurozone’s slow economic recovery appears to have weathered the initial shock ofBritain’s vote to leave the EU with a closely watched survey of business activity reaching itshighest level in seven months.

　　歐元區(qū)緩慢的經(jīng)濟復(fù)蘇似乎經(jīng)受住了英國脫歐公投的首輪沖擊，一項備受關(guān)注的調(diào)查顯示，歐元區(qū)商業(yè)活動達到了7個月來最高水平。

　　The purchasing managers’ index — which measures orders, production and deliveries to providea snapshot of corporate health — rose in August to 53.3 from 53.2 in July; a reading above 50signals economic expansion.

　　8月份采購經(jīng)理人指數(shù)(PMI)升至53.3，7月為53.2。該指數(shù)衡量訂單、生產(chǎn)和交貨情況，提供了企業(yè)健康概況，50以上表示經(jīng)濟擴張。

　　Coupled with a rise in a separate eurozone economic sentiment indicator, published by theEuropean Commission, the data are the latest to confound expectations of a sharp drop-offfollowing the Brexit vote.

　　同時歐盟委員會(European Commission)發(fā)布的歐元區(qū)經(jīng)濟信心指標也出現(xiàn)上升。這些數(shù)據(jù)是一個最新證據(jù)，證明英國脫歐公投后經(jīng)濟急劇下降的預(yù)期是錯的。

　　The figures tally with bank lending surveys and other confidence indicators indicating thereferendum has had little impact so far on the eurozone economy.

　　上述數(shù)據(jù)與銀行貸款調(diào)查和其他信心指數(shù)相符，這些調(diào)查和信心指數(shù)表明公投到目前為止對歐元區(qū)經(jīng)濟幾乎沒有影響。

　　Even in Britain itself, data have been mixed. Some measures, including PMIs, point to a rapidslowdown in activity, while others, such as consumer spending, show little change. The trendcontinued yesterday with UK government data showing that sales of commercial propertieshad fallen sharply in July but residential sales held steady.

　　即使對英國本身來說，數(shù)據(jù)也有好有壞。包括PMI在內(nèi)的部分指標指向經(jīng)濟活動快速放緩，而消費者支出等其他指標則顯示變化不大。昨日英國官方數(shù)據(jù)也顯示7月份商業(yè)地產(chǎn)銷售大幅下滑，但住宅銷售保持穩(wěn)定。

　　貿(mào)易英語閱讀文章2

　　Protectionism Doesn't Pay

　　The global financial crisis is no doubt a catalyst for trade protectionism. As the world economy deteriorates, some countries try to boost growth prospects by erecting trade barriers. China calls on these governments not to replay history and revert to protectionism and economic isolationism.

　　Previous global economic crises were usually accompanied by frequent trade disputes. The United States' erection of large-scale tariffs in 1930, for example, triggered a retaliatory global trade war. During the two oil shocks in the 1970s and 1980s, trade frictions emerged when major economies attempted to increase exports by depreciating their currencies. And in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, there was a notable uptick in antidumping actions, countervailing duties and other protectionist measures.

　　The financial crisis is now spilling over into the real economy, hitting sectors like manufacturing and services. In almost all countries, factories are closing and unemployment is rising, creating political pressure and social problems. More and more governments are strengthening intervention in their economies under the excuse of 'economic security' and protecting vulnerable domestic industries to curb imports from other countries, especially those in emerging markets.

　　Trade protectionism differs from legally acceptable measures to protect trade. It is an abuse of remedies provided by multilateral trade rules. This kind of protectionism is morphing into more complex and disguised forms, ranging from conventional tariff and nontariff barriers to technical barriers to trade, industry standards and industry protectionism.

　　With the economic crisis worsening, caution must be taken even in employing trade protection measures consistent with World Trade Organization rules. At the Group of 20 Financial Summit in November 2008, world leaders called for countries to resist trade protectionism and committed themselves to refraining from erecting new barriers to trade and investment, a message strongly echoed by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit at the end of last year, and the World Economic Forum held in Davos last month.

　　History tells us that trade protection measures hurt not only other countries, but eventually the country that erected that trade barrier in the first place.

　　To counter the Great Depression, the U.S. adopted the Smoot-Hawley Act in 1930, which raised import duties of over 20,000 foreign products significantly and provoked protectionist retaliation from other countries. Faced with that crisis, other countries pursued beggar-thy-neighbor policies that slashed global trade volumes from billion in 1929 to billion in 1932. Among the victims, not the least was the U.S. itself, where exports shrank from .2 billion in 1929 to class="main">